全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Auctioning vs. Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Auctioning vs. Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information
	Francisco Alvarez; Francisco J. André
发表日期	2013
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2013
语种	英语
摘要	We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a Bayesian game of incomplete information. At the auction each firm anticipates his role in the secondary market, which affects the firms’ valuation of the permits (that are not common across firms) as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it would occur in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms’ costs are asymmetric enough, especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and uncertainty about the marginal costs is large enough. If market power spills over the auction, the latter is always less cost-effective than grandfathering. One central policy implication is that the specific design of the auction turns out to be crucial for cost-effectiveness. The chances of the auction to outperform grandfathering require that the former is capable of diluting the market power that is present in the secondary market. *** Suggested citation: Alvarez, F., F. J. André, (2013), 'Auctioning vs. Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information', Nota di Lavoro 98.2013, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
特色分类	D44;Q58;L13
关键词	Cap-and-Trade Systems Auctions Grandfathering Market Power Bayesian Games of Incomplete Information
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/auctioning-vs-grandfathering-in-cap-and-trade-systems-with-market-power-and-incomplete-information/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118125
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Francisco Alvarez,Francisco J. André. Auctioning vs. Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information. 2013.

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201311261657311Nota_（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
201311261657434NDL20（1874KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览