| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation and Information Acquisition | |
| Fulvio Fontini; Katrin Millock; Michele Moretto | |
| 发表日期 | 2013 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In many cases consumers cannot observe firms’ investment in quality or safety, but have only beliefs on the average quality of the industry. In addition, the outcome of the collective investment game of the firms may be stochastic since firms cannot control perfectly the technology or external factors that may affect production. In such situations, when only consumers’ subjective perceptions of the industry level of quality matter, the regulator may make information available to firms or subsidize their information acquisition. Under what conditions is it desirable to make information available? We show how firms’ overall level of investment in quality depends upon the parameters of the quality accumulation process, the cost of investment and the number of firms in the industry. We also show the potentially negative effects on the total level of quality from providing information on consumers’ actual valuation. |
| 特色分类 | C73;D92;L15;Q52 |
| 关键词 | Collective Reputation Option Value Quality |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/investments-in-quality-collective-reputation-and-information-acquisition/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118182 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fulvio Fontini,Katrin Millock,Michele Moretto. Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation and Information Acquisition. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| 2013613102531Nota_di（71KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 20136131022374NDL201（1318KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
| 文件名： | 2013613102531Nota_di_Lavoro.jpg |
| 格式： | JPEG |
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