全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Bargaining and Power

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Bargaining and Power
	Dominik Karos
发表日期	2013
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2013
语种	英语
摘要	Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power configuration which is stable with respect to renegotiations. We further show that given this power configuration there is a coalition which is both internally and Nash stable. We consider two different bargaining solutions on apex games and show under which conditions there are core stable coalitions. Finally, we investigate how infeasible coalition might affect the outcome and apply our model to the German parliament.
特色分类	C71;D71
关键词	Coalition Formation Power Bargaining
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/bargaining-and-power/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118192
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Dominik Karos. Bargaining and Power. 2013.