| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals |
| A.K.S. Chand; Sergio Currarini; Giovanni Ursino
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| 发表日期 | 2013
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2013
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders' equilibrium behavior, making it easier to sustain truth-telling.
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Suggested citation: Chand A.K.S., S. Currarini, G. Ursino (2013), 'Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals' Nota di Lavoro 77.2013, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. |
| 特色分类 | C72;D82;D83
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| 关键词 | Cheap Talk
Multiple Senders
Correlation
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/cheap-talk-with-correlated-signals/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118206
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
A.K.S. Chand,Sergio Currarini,Giovanni Ursino. Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals. 2013.
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20139181624284NDL2013-077.pdf
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