全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Wage Incentive Profiles in Dual Labor Markets

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Wage Incentive Profiles in Dual Labor Markets
	Marco Di Cintio; Emanuele Grassi
发表日期	2014
出处	Economy and Society
出版年	2014
语种	英语
摘要	This paper formalizes the use of flexible labor contracts in an efficiency wage framework and derives market dualism as an endogenous outcome. By allowing temporary contracts to be either renewed or converted into permanent contracts, new theoretical insights emerge both on the equilibrium wage structure and the incentive problem faced by workers and firms. Since temporary workers weigh the outside option of entering the labor market through permanent positions, the rate at which fixed-term contracts are converted into open-ended contracts is itself an incentive device which acts as a substitute for the wage. It follows that, even if temporary workers face a higher job loss risk, firms pay a wage differential in favor of permanent workers. The model also predicts that in equilibrium firms hire exclusively under flexible contracts, then half of them is converted into stable contracts while the remaining contracts are left to expire. Thus, in steady state, firms let permanent positions to survive in order to sustain the wage incentive structure. *** Suggested citation: Di Cintio, M., E. Grassi, (2014), 'Wage Incentive Profiles in Dual Labor Markets', Nota di Lavoro 22.2014, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
特色分类	J31;J41;J63
关键词	Dual Labor Market Efficiency Wages Wage Differentials Flexible Contracts
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/wage-incentive-profiles-in-dual-labor-markets/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118275
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Marco Di Cintio,Emanuele Grassi. Wage Incentive Profiles in Dual Labor Markets. 2014.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
2014371150181Nota_di（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
2014371150324NDL2014（1043KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览