全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Pairing Games and Markets

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Pairing Games and Markets
	Ahmet Alkan; Alparslan Tuncay
发表日期	2014
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2014
语种	英语
摘要	Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also introduce the solution concept of pseudostable allocations and show that they are in the Demand Bargaining Set. We give a dynamic Market Procedure that reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here. *** Suggested citation: Alkan, A., A. Tuncay, (2014), 'Pairing Games and Markets' Nota di Lavoro 48.2014, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
特色分类	C71;C78
关键词	Stable Matching Competitive Equilibrium Market Design NTU Assignment Game Roommate Problem Coalition Formation Bargaining Set Bilateral Transaction Gallai Edmonds Decomposition
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/pairing-games-and-markets/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118298
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Ahmet Alkan,Alparslan Tuncay. Pairing Games and Markets. 2014.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
2014591237471Nota_di（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
201459123844NDL2014-（1275KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览