全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Bidding for Conservation Contracts

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Bidding for Conservation Contracts
	Luca Di Corato; Cesare Dosi; Michele Moretto
发表日期	2014
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2014
语种	英语
摘要	Contracts providing payments for not developing natural areas, or for removing cropland from production, generally require long-term commitments. Landowners, however, can decide to prematurely terminate the contract when the opportunity cost of complying with conservation requirements increases. The paper investigates how this can affect bidding behavior in multi-dimensional auctions, where agents bid on both the conservation plan and the required payment, when contracts do not provide for sufficiently strong incentives against early exit. Integrating the literature on scoring auctions with that which views non-enforcement of contract terms as a source of real-options, the paper offers the following contributions. First, it is shown that bidders’ expected payoff is higher when facing enforceable project deadlines. Second, that failure to account for the risk of opportunistic behavior could lead to the choice of sellers who will not provide the contracting agency with the highest potential payoff. Finally, we examine the role that eligibility rules and the degree of competition can play in avoiding such potential bias in contract allocation.
特色分类	C61;D44;D86;Q24;Q28
关键词	Conservation Contracts Scoring Auctions Non-enforceable Contract Duration Real Options
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/bidding-for-conservation-contracts/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118301
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Luca Di Corato,Cesare Dosi,Michele Moretto. Bidding for Conservation Contracts. 2014.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
2014711108531Nota_di（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
20147111056234NDL201（1250KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览