G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
What’s the Damage? Environmental Regulation with Policy-Motivated Bureaucrats
Achim Voß; Jörg Lingens
发表日期2014
出处Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government’s choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to misreport environmental effects in order to influence policy. This transforms a problem of uncertainty into one of asymmetric information. We analyze the ensuing principal-agent relationship and derive the government’s optimal contract, which conditions policy and rewards on reported environmental effects. We find that agents who are more environmentalist than the government are rewarded for admitting that the environmental impact is low (and vice versa). With higher uncertainty, the bureaucrat has a stronger influence on policy. For some values of the environmental impact, the bureau is permitted to set its own preferred policy (optimal delegation) *** Suggested citation: A. Voß, J. Lingens, (2014), 'What’s the Damage? Environmental Regulation with Policy-Motivated Bureaucrats', Nota di Lavoro 66.2014, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
特色分类D73;D82;C61;Q52;Q58
关键词Environmental Policy Political Economy Delegation Bureaucracy Regulatory Agency Mechanism Design Type-dependent Participation Constraint Pure State Constraints in Optimal Control
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/what-s-the-damage-environmental-regulation-with-policy-motivated-bureaucrats/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118305
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Achim Voß,Jörg Lingens. What’s the Damage? Environmental Regulation with Policy-Motivated Bureaucrats. 2014.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
2014714933221Nota_di(71KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
20147151230114NDL201(1393KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Achim Voß]的文章
[Jörg Lingens]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Achim Voß]的文章
[Jörg Lingens]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Achim Voß]的文章
[Jörg Lingens]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: 2014714933221Nota_di_Lavoro.jpg
格式: JPEG
文件名: 20147151230114NDL2014-066.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。