| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emission Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition |
| Francisco J. André; Luis M. de Castro
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| 发表日期 | 2015
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2015
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | It has been shown in prior research that cost effectiveness in the competitive emissions permit market could be affected by tacit collusion or price manipulation when the corresponding polluting product market is oligopolistic. We analyze these cross market links using a Stackelberg model to show that under reasonable assumptions, there are no incentives to collude for lobbying prices up. However, incentives for manipulating the price of permits up appear if there is an initial free allocation of permits, which is a policy argument against grandfathering and in favor of auctioning. This effect is increasing with the amount of permits allocated to the leader. Moreover, the changes for price manipulation increase with those changes that tend to undermine the leader's advantage in output production or to reduce the leader’s abatement cost.
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Suggested citation: André, F. J., L. M. de Castro, (2015), 'Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emission Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition', Nota di Lavoro 6.2015, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. |
| 特色分类 | D43;L13;Q58
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| 关键词 | Emissions Permits
Collusion
Market Power
Duopoly
Stackelberg Model
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/incentives-for-price-manipulation-in-emission-permit-markets-with-stackelberg-competition/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118369
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Francisco J. André,Luis M. de Castro. Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emission Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition. 2015.
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