G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Luring Others into Climate Action: Coalition Formation Games with Threshold and Spillover Effects
Valentina Bosetti; Melanie Heugues; Alessandro Tavoni
发表日期2015
出处Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要We study the effect of leadership in an experimental threshold public ‘bad’ game, where we manipulate both the relative returns of two investments (the more productive of which causes a negative externality) and the extent to which the gains from leadership diffuse to the group. The game tradeoffs mimic those faced by countries choosing to what degree and when to transition from incumbent polluting technologies to cleaner alternatives, with the overall commitment dictating whether they manage to avert dangerous environmental thresholds. Leading countries, by agreeing on a shared effort, may be pivotal in triggering emission reductions in non-signatories countries. In addition, the leaders’ coalition might also work as innovation and technology adoption catalyzer, thus producing a public good (knowledge) that benefits all countries. In our game, players can choose to tie their hands to a cooperative strategy by signing up to a coalition of first movers. The game is setup such that as long as the leading group reaches a pivotal size, its early investment in the externality-free project may catalyze cooperation by non-signatories. We find that the likelihood of reaching the pivotal size is higher when the benefits of early cooperation are completely appropriated by the coalition members, less so when these benefits spillover to the non-signatories. On the other hand, spillovers have the potential to entice second movers into adopting the ‘clean’ technology. *** Suggested citation: Bosetti, V., M. Heugues, A. Tavoni, (2015), 'Luring Others into Climate Action: Coalition Formation Games with Threshold and Spillover Effects', Nota di Lavoro 21.2015, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
特色分类Q5;Q58
关键词Climate Change International Cooperation R&D Spillovers Threshold Public Goods Game Coalition Formation Game Climate Experiment
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/luring-others-into-climate-action-coalition-formation-games-with-threshold-and-spillover-effects/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118382
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Valentina Bosetti,Melanie Heugues,Alessandro Tavoni. Luring Others into Climate Action: Coalition Formation Games with Threshold and Spillover Effects. 2015.
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