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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Why Finance Ministers Favor Carbon Taxes, Even if They Do not Take Climate Change into Account | |
Max Franks; Ottmar Edenhofer; Kai Lessmann | |
发表日期 | 2015 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2015 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Fiscal considerations may shift governmental priorities away from environmental concerns: Finance ministers face strong demand for public expenditures such as infrastructure investments but they are constrained by international tax competition. We develop a multi-region model of tax competition and resource extraction to assess the fiscal incentive of imposing a tax on carbon rather than on capital. We explicitly model international capital and resource markets, as well as intertemporal capital accumulation and resource extraction. While fossil resources give rise to scarcity rents, capital does not. With carbon taxes the rents can be captured and invested in infrastructure, which leads to higher welfare than under capital taxation. This result holds even without modeling environmental damages. It is robust under a variation of the behavioral assumptions of resource importers to coordinate their actions, and a resource exporter's ability to counteract carbon policies. Further, no green paradox occurs - instead, the carbon tax constitutes a viable green policy, since it postpones extraction and reduces cumulative emissions. *** Franks, M., O. Edenhofer, K. Lessmann, (2015), 'Why Finance Ministers Favor Carbon Taxes, Even if They Do not Take Climate Change into Account', Nota di Lavoro 37.2015, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei |
特色分类 | F21;H21;H30;H73;Q38 |
关键词 | Carbon Pricing Green Paradox Infrastructure Optimal Taxation Strategic Instrument Choice Supply-Side Dynamics Tax Competition |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/why-finance-ministers-favor-carbon-taxes-even-if-they-do-not-take-climate-change-into-account/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118392 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Max Franks,Ottmar Edenhofer,Kai Lessmann. Why Finance Ministers Favor Carbon Taxes, Even if They Do not Take Climate Change into Account. 2015. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
2015430936361Nota_di(71KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
2015430936454NDL2015(2508KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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