全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies
	Yann Rébillé; Lionel Richefort
发表日期	2015
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2015
语种	英语
摘要	We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition. *** Suggested citation: Rébillé, Y., Richefort, L., 'Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies', Nota di Lavoro 57.2015, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
特色分类	C72;D85;H41
关键词	Bipartite Graph Public Good Nash Equilibrium Non-Linear Complementarity Problem
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/networks-of-many-public-goods-with-non-linear-best-replies/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118409
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Yann Rébillé,Lionel Richefort. Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies. 2015.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
20156161542581Nota_d（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
2015616154374NDL2015（1071KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览