全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands
	Ricardo Nieva
发表日期	2015
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2015
语种	英语
摘要	We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can form if an only if payoff demands are feasible as in the Nash (1953) demand game. After smoothing the game (as in Van Damme (1991)), when the noise vanishes, when the discount factor is close to 1, and as in Okada´s (2011), the coalitional Nash bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium. *** Suggested citation: Nieva, R., (2015), 'The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands', Nota di Lavoro 67.2015, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
特色分类	C71;C72;C78
关键词	Coalitional Bargaining Nash Program Simultaneous Payoff Demands Uncertainty
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-coalitional-nash-bargaining-solution-with-simultaneous-payoff-demands/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118421
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Ricardo Nieva. The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands. 2015.

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文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
20157161436111Nota_d（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
20157161436184NDL201（1078KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览