| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Tipping Points and Loss Aversion in International Environmental Agreements |
| Doruk Iris; Alessandro Tavoni
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| 发表日期 | 2016
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| 出处 | Climate Change: Economic Impacts and Adaptation
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| 出版年 | 2016
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We study the impact of loss-aversion and the threat of catastrophic damages, which we jointly call threshold concerns, on international environmental agreements. We aim to understand whether a threshold for dangerous climate change is as an effective coordination device for countries to overcome the global free-riding problem and abate sufficiently to avoid disaster. We focus on loss-averse countries negotiating either under the threat of either high environmental damages (loss domain), or low damages (gain domain). Under symmetry, that is when countries display identical degrees of threshold concern, we show that such beliefs have a positive effect on reducing the emission levels of both signatories to the treaty and non-signatories, leading to higher global welfare and weakly larger coalitions of signatories. We then introduce asymmetry, by allowing countries to differ in the degree of concern about the threat of disaster. We show that stable coalitions are mostly formed by the countries with higher threshold concern. When enough countries having no threshold concern could cause the coalition size to diminish, regardless of the other countries have strong or mild threshold concerns.
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Suggested citation: Iris, D., A. Tavoni, (2016), 'Tipping Points and Loss Aversion in International Environmental Agreements', Nota di Lavoro 25.2016, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei |
| 特色分类 | D0;D03;Q5;Q50;Q58
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| 关键词 | Catastrophic Climate Change
Threshold
Loss-Aversion
International Environmental Agreements
Coalition Formation Game
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/tipping-points-and-loss-aversion-in-international-environmental-agreements/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118473
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Doruk Iris,Alessandro Tavoni. Tipping Points and Loss Aversion in International Environmental Agreements. 2016.
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