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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Delegation and Public Pressure in a Threshold Public Goods Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence | |
Doruk Iris; Jungmin Lee; Alessandro Tavoni | |
发表日期 | 2016 |
出处 | Economic Theory |
出版年 | 2016 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The provision of global public goods, such as climate change mitigation and managing fisheries to avoid overharvesting, requires the coordination of national contributions. The contributions are managed by elected governments who, in turn, are subject to public pressure on the matter. In an experimental setting, we randomly assign subjects into four teams, and ask them to elect a delegate by a secret vote. The elected delegates repeatedly play a one shot public goods game in which the aim is to avoid losses that can ensue if the sum of their contributions falls short of a threshold. Earnings are split evenly among the team members, including the delegate. We find that delegation causes a small reduction in the group contributions. Public pressure, in the form of teammates’ messages to their delegate, has a significant negative effect on contributions, even though the messages are designed to be payoff-inconsequential (i.e., cheap talk). The reason for the latter finding is that delegates tend to focus on the least ambitious suggestion. In other words, they focus on the lower of the two public good contributions preferred by their teammates. This finding is consistent with the prediction of our model, a modified version of regret theory. *** Suggested citation: Iris, D., J. Lee, A. Tavoni, (2016), 'Delegation and Public Pressure in a Threshold Public Goods Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence', Nota di Lavoro 26.2016, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei |
特色分类 | C72;C92;D81;H4;Q54 |
关键词 | Delegation Cooperation Threshold Public Goods Game Climate Experiment Regret Theory |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/delegation-and-public-pressure-in-a-threshold-public-goods-game-theory-and-experimental-evidence/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118475 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Doruk Iris,Jungmin Lee,Alessandro Tavoni. Delegation and Public Pressure in a Threshold Public Goods Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence. 2016. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
20163221028291Nota_d(71KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
20163221028514NDL201(1900KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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