| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| A Note on Pollution Regulation With Asymmetric Information |
| Pench; Alberto
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| 发表日期 | 2016
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| 出处 | Economic Theory
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| 出版年 | 2016
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | The paper addresses the problem of information asymmetry between a regulator and the polluting firms and proposes a very simple mechanism where the regulator is free to choose, without communicating in advance to the firms, between two instruments: an effluent fee or a standard: as a result in a real world setting this uncertainty might induce firms to a truthful revelation. Moreover, under the assumption of linear marginal abatement or marginal social damage functions, in many cases the resulting optimal behaviour might be an under reporting for some firms and an over reporting for others so that the resulting marginal aggregate benefit function might be not so far from the true one and the aggregate pollution level attained by the mechanism not so far from optimal.
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Suggested citation: Pench, A., (2016), 'A Note on Pollution Regulation With Asymmetric Information', Nota di Lavoro 20.2016, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei |
| 特色分类 | H23;Q5
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| 关键词 | Effluent Fee
Standards
Asymmetric Information
Truthful Revelation
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/a-note-on-pollution-regulation-with-asymmetric-information/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118478
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Pench,Alberto. A Note on Pollution Regulation With Asymmetric Information. 2016.
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201639114264NDL2016-020.pdf
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