全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Strategic Use of Abatement by a Polluting Monopoly

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	The Strategic Use of Abatement by a Polluting Monopoly
	Guiomar Martín-Herrán; Santiago J. Rubio
发表日期	2016
出处	Economic Theory
出版年	2016
语种	英语
摘要	This paper evaluates the effects of the lack of regulatory commitment on emission tax applied by the regulator, abatement effort made by the monopoly and social welfare comparing two alternative policy games. The first game assumes that the regulator commits to an ex-ante level of the emission tax. In the second one, in a first stage the regulator and the monopolist simultaneously choose the emission tax and abatement respectively, and in a second stage the monopolist selects the output level. We find that the lack of commitment leads to lower taxation and abatement that yield larger emissions and, consequently, a larger steady-state pollution stock. Moreover, the increase of environmental damages because of the increase in the pollution stock more than compensates the increase in consumer surplus and the decrease in abatement costs resulting in a reduction of social welfare. Thus, our analysis indicates that the lack of commitment has a negative impact of welfare although this detrimental effect decreases with abatement costs. *** Suggested citation: Martín-Herrán, G., S. J. Rubio, (2016), 'The Strategic Use of Abatement by a Polluting Monopoly', Nota di Lavoro 58.2016, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
特色分类	H23;L12;L51;Q52;Q55
关键词	Monopoly Commitment Emission Tax Abatement Stock Pollutant
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-strategic-use-of-abatement-by-a-polluting-monopoly/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118510
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Guiomar Martín-Herrán,Santiago J. Rubio. The Strategic Use of Abatement by a Polluting Monopoly. 2016.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
20168311131171Nota_d（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
20168311131394NDL201（1248KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览