全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties
	Cesare Dosi; Michele Moretto
发表日期	2017
出处	Economic Theory
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	Drawing on the real-options theory we analyse bidding behaviour in a sealed-bid-first-score procurement auction where suppliers, facing variable production costs, must simultaneously report the contract price and the cost level at which they intend to perform the project. We show that this award mechanism is potentially able to maximize total welfare. Next we look at the time incentives required to ensure compliance with the promised optimal trigger value. We show that ex-post efficiency may call for delay penalties higher than the anticipated harm caused by time overruns, in so doing questioning the efficiency rationale of existing liquidated damages rules. *** Suggested citation: Dosi, C., M. Moretto, (2017), 'Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties', Nota di Lavoro 2.2017, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
特色分类	C61;D44;D86;K12
关键词	Public Procurement Fixed-price Contracts Real Options Time Overruns Scoring Auctions Liquidated Damages
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/cost-uncertainty-and-time-overruns-in-public-procurement-a-scoring-auction-for-a-contract-with-delay-penalties/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118519
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Cesare Dosi,Michele Moretto. Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties. 2017.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
20171131113361Nota_d（71KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览
20171131113564NDL201（643KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览