G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Tragedy of the Commons and Evolutionary Games in Social Networks: The Economics of Social Punishment
Jorge Marco; Renan Goetz
发表日期2017
出处Economic Theory
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要This study revisits the problem of the tragedy of the commons. Extracting agents participate in an evolutionary game in a complex social network and are subject to social pressure if they do not comply with the social norms. Social pressure depends on the dynamics of the resource, the network and the population of compliers. We analyze the influence the network structure has on the agents’ behavior and determine the economic value of the intangible good - social pressure. For a socially optimal management of the resource, an initially high share of compliers is necessary but is not sufficient. The analysis shows the extent to which the remaining level of the resource, the share of compliers and the size, density and local cohesiveness of the network contribute to overcoming the tragedy of the commons. The study suggests that the origin of the problem – shortsighted behavior - is also the starting point for a solution in the form of a one-time payment. A numerical analysis of a social network comprising 7500 agents and a realistic topological structure is performed using empirical data from the western La Mancha aquifer in Spain. *** Suggested citation: Marco, J., R. Goetz, (2017), 'Tragedy of the Commons and Evolutionary Games in Social Networks: The Economics of Social Punishment', Nota di Lavoro 35.2017, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
特色分类C71;D85;Q25
关键词Tragedy of the Commons Cooperation Evolutionary Game Social Network Social Punishment
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/tragedy-of-the-commons-and-evolutionary-games-in-social-networks-the-economics-of-social-punishment/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/118571
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jorge Marco,Renan Goetz. Tragedy of the Commons and Evolutionary Games in Social Networks: The Economics of Social Punishment. 2017.
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