| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Working Paper)
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Strategic Response with Perfect Information. |
| Dubey P
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| 发表日期 | 1981
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| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: WP-81-077
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| 出版年 | 1981
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Take a game in extensive form with perfect information. Start with an arbitrary choice of strategies by the players. Now let each player -- if he can -- deviate unilaterally to a strategy that will improve his payoff, on the assumption that the others stay put with their choices. This gives rise to a new revised choice of strategies. Iterate the process. We will show that the sequence of strategic choices thus generated becomes stationary, and (of course) constitutes a Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) of the game. This result is embarrassingly simple to prove but seems to us to merit being on record. It does somewhat more than re-establish the classical existence of an N.E. for such games. It shows that the N.E.'s are obtained under the simple dynamic of unilateral strategic improvements. Such improvements underlie the very notion of an N.E. (which is defined to occur when they cannot be made), and so it is natural to use them to set up an associated dynamic. |
| 主题 | System and Decision Sciences - Core (SDS)
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| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/1684/
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| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/122290
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Dubey P. Strategic Response with Perfect Information.. 1981.
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文件名：
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WP-81-077.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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