| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report) |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| Learning Equilibria in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations. | |
| Kaniovski YM; Kryazhimskiy AV; Young HP | |
| 发表日期 | 1997 |
| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-97-017 |
| 出版年 | 1997 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider two populations of agents who learn to play a game through. repetition. In fictitious play, each agent chooses a best replay to the frequency distribution of actions taken by the other side. A natural variant of this model is to assume that agents are heterogeneous in their information and their behavioral response rules. Assume that each agent knows only a randomly drawn sample of past actions. Given their information, agents sometimes choose best replies, and sometimes they imitate behavior in their own population. In contrast to the stochastic best reply dynamics studied by Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), Kaniovski and Young (1995), and Benaiem and Hirsch (1994), such process can cycle in a 2x2 game even when the probability of imitators is arbitrarily small. We show how to characterize its asymptotic behavior through an extension of Bendixon's theory for excluding cycles combined with standard techniques from stochastic approximation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C44, C73, D83. |
| 主题 | Technological and Economic Dynamics (TED) |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/5274/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/124725 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kaniovski YM,Kryazhimskiy AV,Young HP. Learning Equilibria in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations.. 1997. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| IR-97-017.pdf（114KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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