| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report) |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| The Behavioral Firm and Its Internal Game: Evolutionary Dynamics of Decision Making. | |
| Vries F de | |
| 发表日期 | 1999 |
| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-99-036 |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper the firm is analyzed and modeled as a set of different subcoalitions (agents) each with their own objectives. It examines how the goals can be conflicting and in turn how this influences the payoff structure of the subcoalitions given that they follow 'simple' decision rules, i.e. rules of thumb. This implies that the subcoalitions act in aboundedly rational way. To see how these decision making procedures evolve we make use of an (evolutionary) dynamic game theoretical framework. Consequently, the main aim is to address the issue of modeling the dynamic and adaptive nature of the subcoalitions. |
| 主题 | Dynamic Systems (DYN) |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/5906/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/124912 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vries F de. The Behavioral Firm and Its Internal Game: Evolutionary Dynamics of Decision Making.. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| IR-99-036.pdf（265KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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