| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report) |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| Evolutionary Optimization Models and Matrix Games in the Unified Perspective of Adaptive Dynamics. | |
| Meszena G; Kisdi E; Dieckmann U; Geritz SAH; Metz JAJ | |
| 发表日期 | 2000 |
| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-00-039 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Matrix game theory and optimization models offer two radically different perspectives on the outcome of evolution. Optimization models consider frequency-independent selection and envisage evolution as a hill-climbing process on a constant fitness landscape, with the optimal strategy corresponding to the fitness maximum. By contrast, in evolutionary matrix games selection is frequency-dependent and leads to fitness equality among alternative strategies once an evolutionarily stable strategy has been established. In this review we demonstrate that both optimization models and matrix games represent special cases within the general framework of adaptive dynamics. Adaptive dynamics theory considers arbitrary nonlinear frequency and density dependence and envisages evolution as proceeding on an adaptive landscape that changes its shape according to which strategies are present in the population. In adaptive dynamics, evolutionarily stable strategies correspond to conditional fitness maxima: the ESS is characterized by the fact that it has the highest fitness if it is the established strategy. In this framework it can also be shown that dynamical attainability, evolutionary stability, and invading potential of strategies are pairwise independent properties. In optimization models, on the other hand, these properties become linked such that the optimal strategy is always attracting, evolutionarily stable and can invade any other strategy. In matrix games fitness is a linear function of the potentially invading strategy and can thus never exhibit an interior maximum: Instead, the fitness landscape is a plane that becomes horizontal once the ESS is established. Due to this degeneracy, invading potential is part of the ESS definition for matrix games and dynamical attainability is a dependent property. We conclude that adaptive dynamics provides a unifying framework for overcoming the traditional divide between evolutionary optimization models and matrix games. |
| 主题 | Adaptive Dynamics Network (ADN) |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/6206/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/124984 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Meszena G,Kisdi E,Dieckmann U,et al. Evolutionary Optimization Models and Matrix Games in the Unified Perspective of Adaptive Dynamics.. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| IR-00-039.pdf（366KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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