| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report) |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| Oscillations in Optional Public Good Games. | |
| Hauert C; De Monte S; Sigmund K; Hofbauer J | |
| 发表日期 | 2001 |
| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-01-036 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a new mechanism promoting cooperative behavior among selfish individuals in the public goods game. This game represents a straightforward generalization of the prisoner's dilemma to an arbitrary number of players. In contrast to the compulsory public goods game, optional participation provides a natural way to avoid deadlocks in the state of mutual defection. The three resulting strategies - collaboration or defection in the public goods game, as well as not joining at all -are studied by means of a replicator dynamics, which can be completely analysed in spite of the fact that some payoff terms are nonlinear. If cooperation is valuable enough, the dynamics exhibits a rock-scissors-paper type of cycling between the three strategies, leading to sizeable average levels of cooperation in the population. Thus, voluntary participation makes cooperation possible. But for each strategy, the average payoff value remains equal to the earnings of those not participating in the public goods game. |
| 主题 | Adaptive Dynamics Network (ADN) |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/6486/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/125082 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hauert C,De Monte S,Sigmund K,et al. Oscillations in Optional Public Good Games.. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| IR-01-036.pdf（157KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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