| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report) |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| The Dynamics of Public Goods. | |
| Hauert C; Haiden N; Sigmund K | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-04-086 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the replicator equation for two games closely related with the social dilemma occurring in public goods situation. In one case, players can punish defectors in their group. In another case, they can choose not to take part in the game. In both cases, interactions are not pairwise and payoffs are nonlinear. Nevertheless, the qualitative dynamics can be fully analyzed. The games offer potential solutions for the problem of the emergence of cooperation in sizeable groups of non-related individuals - a basic question in evolutionary biology and economics. |
| 主题 | Adaptive Dynamics Network (ADN) |
| 关键词 | Evolutionary game theory Public goods games Replicator dynamics |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7364/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/125290 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hauert C,Haiden N,Sigmund K. The Dynamics of Public Goods.. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| IR-04-086.pdf（404KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
