G2TT
来源类型Monograph (IIASA Research Report (Reprint))
规范类型报告
Multiequilibrium Game of Timing and Competition of Gas Pipeline Projects.
Klaassen G; Kryazhimskiy AV; Tarasyev AM
发表日期2004
出版者IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: RP-04-002.
出版年2004
语种英语
摘要The paper addressed the issue of the optimal investments in innovations with strong long-term aftereffects. As an example, investments in the construction of gas pipelines are considered. The most sensitive part of an investment project is the choice of commercialization time (stopping time), i.e., the time of finalizing the construction of the pipeline. If several projects compete in the market, the choices of the commercialization times determine the future structure of the market and thus become specially important. Rational decisions in this respect can be associated with Nash equilibria in a game between the projects. In this game, the total benefits gained during the pipelines life periods act as payoffs and the commercialization times as strategies. The goal of this paper is to characterize multiequilibria in the game of timing. The case of two players is studied in detail. A key point in the analysis is the observation that, for all players, the best response commercialization times concentrate at two instants that are fixed in advance. This reduces decisionmaking to choosing between two fixed investment policies (fast and slow) with the prescribed commercialization times. A description of a simple algorithm that finds all the Nash equilibria composed of fast and slow scenarios concludes the paper.
主题Transboundary Air Pollution (TAP) ; Transboundary Air Pollution (TAP)
关键词Optimal stopping problem Game of timing Multiequilibria Best reply curves Econometric estimation
URLhttp://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7456/
来源智库International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/125385
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GB/T 7714
Klaassen G,Kryazhimskiy AV,Tarasyev AM. Multiequilibrium Game of Timing and Competition of Gas Pipeline Projects.. 2004.
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