| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report) |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| A Survey on Indirect Reciprocity. | |
| Brandt H; Ohtsuki H; Iwasa Y; Sigmund K | |
| 发表日期 | 2006 |
| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-06-065 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This survey deals with indirect reciprocity, i.e., with the possibility that altruistic acts are returned, not by the recipient, but by a third party. After briefly sketching how this problem is dealt with in classical game theory, we describe recent work on the assessment on interactions, and the evolutionary stability of strategies for indirect reciprocation. All stable strategies ( the 'leading eight') distinguish between justified and non-justified defections, and therefore are based on non-costly punishment. Next we consider the replicator dynamics of populations consisting of defectors, discriminators and undiscriminating altruists. We stress that errors can destabilise cooperation for strategies not distinguishing justified from unjustified defections, but that a fixed number of rounds, or the assumption of an individual's social network growing with age, can lead to cooperation based on a stable mixture of undiscriminating altruists and of discriminators who do not distinguish between justified and unjustified defection. We describe previous work using agent-based simulations for 'binary-score' and 'full score' models. Finally, we survey the recent results on experiments with the indirect reciprocation game. |
| 主题 | Evolution and Ecology (EEP) |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/8034/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/125493 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Brandt H,Ohtsuki H,Iwasa Y,et al. A Survey on Indirect Reciprocity.. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| IR-06-065.pdf（354KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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