| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report)
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| Reputation-based conditional interaction supports cooperation in well-mixed prisoner's dilemmas. |
| Chen X; Schick A; Doebeli M; Blachford A; Wang L
|
| 发表日期 | 2012
|
| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-12-027
|
| 出版年 | 2012
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In the well-mixed prisoner's dilemma game, individuals are typically assumed to have no choice about whether to interact with other individuals in the population. In this paper, we instead consider reputation- based conditional interaction and its consequences for the evolution of cooperation. Each individual has a tolerance range, and only interacts with other individuals whose reputation lies within its tolerance range in a chosen sample of the population. Reputation contains information about the number of interaction partners an individual has just cooperated with. We find that the introduction of conditional interaction promotes cooperation in well-mixed populations, and there exist moderate tolerance ranges for which this effect is maximized. For a given tolerance range, there is a critical cost-to-benefit ratio below which cooperation can be promoted. Interestingly, we find that if cooperation evolves, different cooperators' interaction clusters are typically maintained in the population, each around a different reputation level. We further investigate some properties of these cooperators' clusters. Moreover, we examine the effects of the sample number on the evolution of cooperation. Our results highlight the importance of the detailed consideration of modes of interaction for the evolution of cooperation in well-mixed popultions. |
| 主题 | Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
|
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10248/
|
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/125888
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Chen X,Schick A,Doebeli M,et al. Reputation-based conditional interaction supports cooperation in well-mixed prisoner's dilemmas.. 2012.
|
|
文件名：
|
IR-12-027.pdf
|
|
格式：
|
Adobe PDF
|
此文件暂不支持浏览
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
