| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report)
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| Cautious strategy update promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game. |
| Liu Y; Zhang L; Chen X; Ren L; Wang L
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| 发表日期 | 2013
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| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-13-048
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| 出版年 | 2013
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | In the realistic world, individual cautiousness can be often involved or observed when a rational indvidual makes a decision. However, it remains unclear how such individual cautiousness influences the evolution of cooperative behavior. To this end, we consider a Fermi strategy updating rule, where each individual is assigned a cautiousness index that controls its learning activity, and then study the evolution of coperation in the spatial prisoners dilemma game. Interestingly, it is found that cooperation can be significanly promoted when individuals cautiousness is considered. In particular, there exists an optimal range of the degree of cautiousness resulting in the highest cooperation level. The remarkable promotion of cooperation, as well as the emerging phase transition is explained by configurational analysis. The sensitivity of cooperation to initial states with different fractions of cooperators is also discussed. The result illustrates that high densities of cooperators can be established at small initial fractions of cooperators. The detailed mechanism for such phenomenon is explained by analyzing the typical initial configurations. |
| 主题 | Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
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| 关键词 | Prisoner's dilemma
Cooperation
Cautious
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| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10715/
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| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/125941
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Liu Y,Zhang L,Chen X,et al. Cautious strategy update promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game.. 2013.
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文件名：
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IR-13-048.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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