| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report) |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games. | |
| Hilbe C; Nowak MA; Sigmund K | |
| 发表日期 | 2013 |
| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-13-038 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the ability to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of previous interactions, thus allowing for reciprocation. Recently, a new class of strategies has been proposed, so-called "zero-determinant" strategies. These strategies enforce a fixed linear relationship between one's own payoff and that of the other player. A subset of those strategies allows "extortioners" to ensure that any increase in one player.s own payoff exceeds that of the other player by a fixed percentage. Here, we analyze the evolutionary performance of this new class of strategies. We show that in reasonably large populations, they can act as catalysts for the evolution of cooperation, similar to tit-for-tat, but that they are not the stable outcome of natural selection. In very small populations, however, extortioners hold their ground. Extortion strategies do particularly well in coevolutionary arms races between two distinct populations. Significantly, they benefit the population that evolves at the slower rate, an example of the so-called "Red King" effect. This may affect the evolution of interactions between host species and their endosymbionts. |
| 主题 | Evolution and Ecology (EEP) |
| 关键词 | Replicator dynamics Adaptive dynamics |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10725/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/125951 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hilbe C,Nowak MA,Sigmund K. Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games.. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| IR-13-038.pdf（472KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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