| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report) |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer's dilemmas. | |
| Chen X; Gross T; Dieckmann U | |
| 发表日期 | 2013 |
| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-13-025 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | For societies to produce or safeguard public goods, costly voluntary contributions are often required. From the perspective of each individual, however, it is advantageous not to volunteer such contributions, in the hope that other individuals will carry the associated costs. This conflict can be modeled as a volunter's dilemma. To encourage rational individuals to make voluntary contributions, a government or other social organizations can offer rewards, to be shared among the volunteers. Here we apply such shared rewarding to the generalized N-person volunteer's dilemma, in which a threshold number of volunteers is required for producing the public good. By means of theoretical and numerical analyses, we show that without share rewarding only two evolutionary outcomes are possible: full defection or coexistence of volunteers and non-volunteers. We show that already small rewards destabilize full defection, stabilizing small fracions of volunteers instead. Furthermore, at these intermediate reward levels, we find a hysteresis effect such that increasing or decreasing group sizes can trigger different social outcomes. In particular, when group size is increased, the fraction of volunteers first increases gradually before jumping up abruptly; when group size is then decreased again, the fraction of volunteers not only remains high, but even continues to increase. As the shared reward is increased beyond a critical level, the bistablitity underlying this hysteresis effect vanishes altogether, and only a single social outcome remains, corresponding to the stable coexistence of volunteers and non-volunteers. We find that this critical level of shared rewarding is relatively small compared to the total cost of contributing to the public good. These results show that the introduction of shared rewarding is remarkably effective in overcoming defection traps in the generalized volunteer's dilemma. |
| 主题 | Evolution and Ecology (EEP) |
| 关键词 | Evolutionary dynamics Volunteer's dilemma Shared rewarding Voluntary contribution |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/10735/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/125961 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chen X,Gross T,Dieckmann U. Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer's dilemmas.. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| IR-13-025.pdf（1094KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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