| 来源类型 | Monograph (IIASA Interim Report)
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility. |
| Chen X; Perc M
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| 发表日期 | 2014
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| 出版者 | IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-14-023
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| 出版年 | 2014
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initialy receive endowments from the available amount of common resources. While cooperators contribute part of their endowment to the collective target, defectors do not. If the target is not reached, the endowments of all players are lost. In our model, we introduce a feedback between the amount of common resources and the contributions of cooperators. We show that cooperation can be sustained only if the common resources are preserved but never excessively abound. This, however, requires a delicate balance between the amount of common resource that initially exist, and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target. Exceeding critical thresholds in either of the two amounts leads to loss of cooperation, and consequently to the depletion of common resources. |
| 主题 | Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
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| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/11245/
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| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/125990
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Chen X,Perc M. Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility.. 2014.
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文件名：
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IR-14-023.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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