G2TT
来源类型Monograph (IIASA Interim Report)
规范类型报告
Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility.
Chen X; Perc M
发表日期2014
出版者IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-14-023
出版年2014
语种英语
摘要We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initialy receive endowments from the available amount of common resources. While cooperators contribute part of their endowment to the collective target, defectors do not. If the target is not reached, the endowments of all players are lost. In our model, we introduce a feedback between the amount of common resources and the contributions of cooperators. We show that cooperation can be sustained only if the common resources are preserved but never excessively abound. This, however, requires a delicate balance between the amount of common resource that initially exist, and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target. Exceeding critical thresholds in either of the two amounts leads to loss of cooperation, and consequently to the depletion of common resources.
主题Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
URLhttp://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/11245/
来源智库International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/125990
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Chen X,Perc M. Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility.. 2014.
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