| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| DOI | 10.1002/bs.3830230104 |
| The allocation of funds in lobbying and campaigning. | |
| Young HP | |
| 发表日期 | 1978 |
| 出处 | Systems Research 23 (1): 21-31 |
| 出版年 | 1978 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A model is presented to describe how a calculating lobbyist should allocate resources most effectively among voters in a legislature, given that there is no opposition lobbying effort. Equilibrium prices exist provided there is no veto player. When there is opposition, a different model and a different concept of equilibrium result. The outcome of this model is treated for a case when the opposing forces have unequal resources. This results in an equilibrium which is essentially the nucleolus. Application is made to us Presidential campaigning for the Electoral College, and to the setting of legislators' salaries. The models are also shown to lead to new concepts of measuring the relative power of voters. While these measures are related for the competitive and noncompetitive models, their differences also point to the importance of considering the context in which power is to be measured. |
| 主题 | System and Decision Sciences - Core (SDS) |
| 关键词 | Simple game Power Lobbying Presidential campaign Electoral College |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/815/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/126675 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Young HP. The allocation of funds in lobbying and campaigning.. 1978. |
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