| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| DOI | 10.1006/game.1995.1054 |
| Learning dynamics in games with stochastic perturbations. | |
| Kaniovski YM; Young HP | |
| 发表日期 | 1995 |
| 出处 | Games and Economic Behavior 11 (2): 330-363 |
| 出版年 | 1995 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider a generalization of fictitious play in which agents′ choices are perturbed by incomplete information about what the other side has done, variability in their payoffs, and unexplained trembles. These perturbed best reply dynamics define a nonstationary Markov process on an infinite state space. It is shown, using results from stochastic approximation theory, that for 2 × 2 games it converges almost surely to a point that lies close to a stable Nash equilibrium, whether pure or mixed. This generalizes a result of Fudenherg and Kreps, who demonstrate convergence when the game has a unique mixed equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Technological and Economic Dynamics (TED) |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4243/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/127350 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kaniovski YM,Young HP. Learning dynamics in games with stochastic perturbations.. 1995. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Kaniovski YM]的文章 |
| [Young HP]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Kaniovski YM]的文章 |
| [Young HP]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Kaniovski YM]的文章 |
| [Young HP]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
