G2TT
来源类型Article
规范类型其他
DOI10.1007/BF02190097
Optimal allocation of drug control efforts: A differential game analysis.
Feichtinger G; Dawid H
发表日期1996
出处Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 91 (3): 279-297
出版年1996
语种英语
摘要The present paper considers a dynamic nonzero-sum game between drug dealers and the authorities. Although the game is neither linear-quadratic nor degenerate, in the sense that the closed-loop equilibria coincide with the open-loop equilibria, we are able to calculate explicitly a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium of that game. In a numerical example, we determine the optimal allocation of governmental efforts between treatment and law enforcement minimizing the total discounted cost stream in the equilibrium. Moreover, we provide sensitivity analyses with respect to the efficiency parameters of both competitors. Our results show that a farsighted authority should attack the drug problem from the demand side and put much effort in treatment measures and the improvement of the efficiency of the treatment.
主题World Population (POP)
关键词Differential games Drug control Feedback Nash equilibria Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations
URLhttp://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/4632/
来源智库International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/127492
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Feichtinger G,Dawid H. Optimal allocation of drug control efforts: A differential game analysis.. 1996.
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