| 来源类型 | Article
|
| 规范类型 | 其他
|
| DOI | 10.1080/0042098002357
|
| Discretionary Profit in Subsidised Housing Markets. |
| Nentjes A; Schöpp W
|
| 发表日期 | 2000
|
| 出处 | Urban Studies 37 (1): 181-194
|
| 出版年 | 2000
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In the subsidised housing sector, building corporations can use their market power as purchasers to raise output of subsidised housing to a level higher than it is with perfect competition on both sides of the market. This holds true if the building society is perfectly X-efficient. The proposition is not necessarily true if the corporation maximises a utility function in which discretionary profit, or organisational slack, is an argument. The X-inefficient building society may set output higher or lower than with perfect competition. If the government grants a fixed subsidy per house and tries to constrain X-inefficiency by imposing a maximum price, this might be an incentive for the building corporation to maintain a planned shortage of subsidised houses. However, housing shortages will be smaller and welfare possibly greater than it is with perfect competition. The existence of a perfectly competitive non-subsidised housing sector is for the building corporation an incentive to increase strategically the output of subsidised housing and reduce planned shortages; but it does not necessarily eliminate such shortages. |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/13562/
|
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/127863
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Nentjes A,Schöpp W. Discretionary Profit in Subsidised Housing Markets.. 2000.
|
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