| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| DOI | 10.1006/game.1999.0736 |
| Adaptive dynamics in games played by heterogeneous populations. | |
| Kaniovski YM; Kryazhimskiy AV; Young HP | |
| 发表日期 | 2000 |
| 出处 | Games and Economic Behavior 31 (1): 50-96 |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider a population of agents who play a game through repeated interactions, and adapt their behavior based on information about other agents' previous behavior. The standard way of modeling such a process is to assume that everyone in the population is governed by the same adaptive rule, e.g., best response, imitation, or the replicator dynamic. This paper studies heterogeneous populations of agents in which some agents are best responders, others are conformists (they do what the majority does), and still others are nonconformists (they do the opposite of what the majority does). Unlike deterministic best reply processes, which in 2x2 games converge to Nash equilibrium, these heterogeneous processes may have limit cycles; moreover limit cycles may exist even when the proportion of non best responders is arbitrarily small. We show how to analyze the asymptotic behavior of such processes through a suitable generalization of Bendixson stability theory combined with stochastic approximation theory. |
| 主题 | Dynamic Systems (DYN) |
| 关键词 | Best response dynamics Heterogeneous populations Imitation Stability Nash equilibria |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/5971/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/127896 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kaniovski YM,Kryazhimskiy AV,Young HP. Adaptive dynamics in games played by heterogeneous populations.. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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