| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| DOI | 10.1016/S1474-6670(17)35662-8 |
| Optimal Strategies in Game-Control Problems of Timing. | |
| Klaassen G; Kryazhimskii A; Tarasyev A; Kryazhimskii AV; Tarasyev AM | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | IFAC Proceedings Volumes 36 (11): 193-198 |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper addresses the issue of optimal investments in innovations. As an example, investments in the construction of gas pipelines are considered. Rational decisions in choosing the commercialization times (stopping times) can be associated with Nash equilibria in a game between the projects. In this game, the total benefits gained during the pipelines’ life periods act as payoffs and commercialization times as strategies. The goal of this paper is to characterize multiequilibria in the game of timing. The case of two players is studied in detail. A key point in the analysis is the observation that all player’s best response commercialization times concentrate at two instants that are fixed in advance. This reduces decisionmaking to choosing between two fixed investment policies, fast and slow, with the prescribed commercialization times. A description of a computational algorithm that finds all the Nash equilibria composed of fast and slow scenarios concludes the paper. |
| 关键词 | Optimal stopping problem game of timing multiequilibria econometric analysis |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/14607/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/128167 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Klaassen G,Kryazhimskii A,Tarasyev A,et al. Optimal Strategies in Game-Control Problems of Timing.. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| 1-s2.0-S147466701735（703KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
