| 来源类型 | Article
|
| 规范类型 | 其他
|
| DOI | 10.1002/nav.10096
|
| Efficient distributions of arms-control inspection effort. |
| Avenhaus R; Kilgour M
|
| 发表日期 | 2004
|
| 出处 | Naval Research Logistics 51 (1): 1-27
|
| 出版年 | 2004
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | A rule that constrains decision-makers is enforced by an inspector who is supplied with a fixed level of inspection resources - inspection personnel, equipment, or time. How should the inspector distribute its inspection resources over several independent inspectees? What minimum level of resources is required to deter all violations? Optimal enforcement problems occur in many contexts; the motivating application for this study is the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Using game-theoretic models, the resource level adequate for deterrence is characterized in a two-inspectee problem with inspections that are imperfect in the sense that violations can be missed. Detection functions, or probabilities of detecting a violation, are assumed to be increasing in inspection resources, permitting optimal allocations over inspectees to be described both in general and in special cases. When detection functions are convex, inspection effort should be concentrated on one inspectee chosen at random, but when they are concave it should be spread deterministicly over the inspectees. Our analysis provides guidance for the design of arms-control verification operations, and implies that a priori constraints on the distribution of inspection effort can result in significant inefficiencies. |
| 主题 | Processes of International Negotiation Network (PIN)
|
| 关键词 | Arms control
inspection
game theory
IAEA
NPT
verification
safeguards
detection function
|
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7113/
|
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
|
| 引用统计 |
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/128341
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Avenhaus R,Kilgour M. Efficient distributions of arms-control inspection effort.. 2004.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
