| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| DOI | 10.3934/dcdsb.2004.4.575 |
| The dynamics of public goods. | |
| Hauert C; Haiden N; Sigmund K | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems - Series B 4 (3): 575-587 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the replicator equation for two games closely related with the social dilemma occurring in public goods situations. In one case, players can punish defectors in their group. In the other case, they can choose not to take part in the game. In both cases, interactions are not pairwise and payoffs non-linear. Nevertheless, the qualitative dynamics can be fully analyzed. The games offer potential solutions for the problem of the emergence of cooperation in sizeable groups of non-related individuals - a basic question in evolutionary biology and economics. |
| 主题 | Adaptive Dynamics Network (ADN) |
| 关键词 | Evolutionary game theory Public goods games Replicator dynamics |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7154/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/128378 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hauert C,Haiden N,Sigmund K. The dynamics of public goods.. 2004. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
