| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| DOI | 10.1080/13926292.2004.9637251 |
| Applications of inspection games. | |
| Avenhaus R | |
| 发表日期 | 2004 |
| 出处 | Mathematical Modelling and Analysis 9 (3): 179-192 |
| 出版年 | 2004 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An inspection game is a mathematical model of a non-cooperative situation where an inspector verifies that another party, called inspectee, adheres to legal rules. The inspector wishes to deter illegal activity on the part of the inspectee and, should illegal activity nevertheless take place, detect it with the highest possible probability and as soon as possible. The inspectee may have some incentive to violate his commitments and violation, if observed, will incur punishment. Therefore if he chooses illegal behaviour, the inspectee will wish to avoid detection with the highest possible probability. Three examples of applications are presented. The first one deals with random controls in public transportation systems. The second one describes the problem of verification of arms control and disarmament in a very general way. The third one deals with inspections over time which are important in the context of non-proliferation verification. |
| 主题 | Processes of International Negotiation Network (PIN) |
| 关键词 | Extensive form game interim inspection Nash equilibrium normal form game public transportation verification of arms control and disarmament agreements |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7173/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/128395 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Avenhaus R. Applications of inspection games.. 2004. |
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