| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| DOI | 10.1073/pnas.0507229103 |
| Punishing and abstaining for public goods. | |
| Brandt H; Hauert C; Sigmund K | |
| 发表日期 | 2006 |
| 出处 | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103 (2): 495-497 |
| 出版年 | 2006 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The evolution of cooperation within sizable groups of nonrelated humans offers many challenges for our understanding. Current research has highlighted two factors boosting cooperation in public goods interactions, namely, costly punishment of defectors and the option to abstain from the joint enterprise. A recent modeling approach has suggested that the autarkic option acts as a catalyzer for the ultimate fixation of altruistic punishment. We present an alternative, more microeconomically based model that yields a bistable outcome instead. Evolutionary dynamics can lead either to a Nash equilibrium of punishing and nonpunishing cooperators or to an oscillating state without punishers. |
| 主题 | Evolution and Ecology (EEP) |
| 关键词 | Altruistic punishment Cooperation Evolutionary game theory |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7902/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/128503 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Brandt H,Hauert C,Sigmund K. Punishing and abstaining for public goods.. 2006. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| Punishing%20and%20ab（186KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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