全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Public goods with punishment and abstaining in finite and infinite populations.

G2TT

来源类型	Article
规范类型	其他
DOI	10.1162/biot.2008.3.2.114
	Public goods with punishment and abstaining in finite and infinite populations.
	Hauert C; Traulsen A; De Silva H; Nowak MA; Sigmund K
发表日期	2008
出处	Biological Theory 3 (2): 114-122
出版年	2008
语种	英语
摘要	The evolution and maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies challenge various disciplines ranging from evolutionary biology to anthropology, social sciences, and economics. In social interactions, cooperators increase the welfare of the group at some cost to themselves whereas defectors attempt to free ride and neither provide benefits nor incur costs. The problem of cooperation becomes even more pronounced when increasing the number of interacting individuals. Punishment and voluntary participation have been identified as possible factors to support cooperation and prevent cheating. Typically, punishment behavior is unable to gain a foothold in a population, while volunteering alone can efficiently prevent deadlocks in states of mutual defection but is unable to stabilize cooperation. The combined effects of the two mechanisms have surprisingly different consequences in finite and infinite populations. Here we provide a detailed comparison of the two scenarios and demonstrate that driven by the inherent stochasticity of finite populations, the possibility to abstain from social interactions plays a pivotal role, which paves the way for the establishment of cooperation and punishment.
主题	Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
关键词	cooperation, evolutionary game theory, public goods games, punishment, social dilemmas, voluntary participation
URL	http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/8563/
来源智库	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/128842
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Hauert C,Traulsen A,De Silva H,et al. Public goods with punishment and abstaining in finite and infinite populations.. 2008.