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来源类型Article
规范类型其他
DOI10.1162/biot.2008.3.2.114
Public goods with punishment and abstaining in finite and infinite populations.
Hauert C; Traulsen A; De Silva H; Nowak MA; Sigmund K
发表日期2008
出处Biological Theory 3 (2): 114-122
出版年2008
语种英语
摘要The evolution and maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies challenge various disciplines ranging from evolutionary biology to anthropology, social sciences, and economics. In social interactions, cooperators increase the welfare of the group at some cost to themselves whereas defectors attempt to free ride and neither provide benefits nor incur costs. The problem of cooperation becomes even more pronounced when increasing the number of interacting individuals. Punishment and voluntary participation have been identified as possible factors to support cooperation and prevent cheating. Typically, punishment behavior is unable to gain a foothold in a population, while volunteering alone can efficiently prevent deadlocks in states of mutual defection but is unable to stabilize cooperation. The combined effects of the two mechanisms have surprisingly different consequences in finite and infinite populations. Here we provide a detailed comparison of the two scenarios and demonstrate that driven by the inherent stochasticity of finite populations, the possibility to abstain from social interactions plays a pivotal role, which paves the way for the establishment of cooperation and punishment.
主题Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
关键词cooperation, evolutionary game theory, public goods games, punishment, social dilemmas, voluntary participation
URLhttp://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/8563/
来源智库International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/128842
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GB/T 7714
Hauert C,Traulsen A,De Silva H,et al. Public goods with punishment and abstaining in finite and infinite populations.. 2008.
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