| 来源类型 | Article |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| DOI | 10.1038/nature09203 |
| Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons. | |
| Sigmund K; De Silva H; Traulsen A; Hauert C | |
| 发表日期 | 2010 |
| 出处 | Nature 466 (7308): 861-863 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Theoretical and empirical research highlights the role of punishment in promoting collaborative efforts. However, both the emergence and the stability of costly punishment are problematic issues. It is not clear how punishers can invade a society of defectors by social learning or natural selection, or how second-order free-riders (who contribute to the joint effort but not to the sanctions) can be prevented from drifting into a coercion-based regime and subverting cooperation. Here we compare the prevailing model of peer-punishment with pool-punishment, which consists in committing resources, before the collaborative effort, to prepare sanctions against free-riders. Pool-punishment facilitates the sanctioning of second-order free-riders, because these are exposed even if everyone contributes to the common good. In the absence of such second-order punishment, peer-punishers do better than pool-punishers; but with second-order punishment, the situation is reversed. Efficiency is traded for stability. Neither other-regarding tendencies or preferences for reciprocity and equity, nor group selection or prescriptions from higher authorities, are necessary for the emergence and stability of rudimentary forms of sanctioning institutions regulating common pool resources and enforcing collaborative efforts. |
| 主题 | Evolution and Ecology (EEP) |
| URL | http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/9167/ |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/129070 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sigmund K,De Silva H,Traulsen A,et al. Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons.. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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