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来源类型Article
规范类型其他
DOI10.1098/rspb.2010.0065
Incentives and opportunism: From the carrot to the stick.
Hilbe C; Sigmund K
发表日期2010
出处Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 277 (1693): 2427-2433
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要Cooperation in public good games is greatly promoted by positive and negative incentives. In this papr, we use evolutionary game dynamics to study the evolution of opportunism (the readiness to be swayed by incentives) and the evolution of trst (the propensity to cooperate in the absence of information on the co-players). If both positive and negative incentives are available, evlution leads to a population where defectors are punished and players cooperate, except when they can get away with defection. Rewarding behaviourdoes not become fixed, but can play an essential role in catalysing the emergence of cooperation, especially if the information level is low.
主题Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
关键词Cooperation Evolutionary game theory Punishment Reputation Reward
URLhttp://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/9197/
来源智库International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/129091
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GB/T 7714
Hilbe C,Sigmund K. Incentives and opportunism: From the carrot to the stick.. 2010.
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