全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism.

G2TT

来源类型	Article
规范类型	其他
DOI	10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8
	Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism.
	De Silva H; Hauert C; Traulsen A; Sigmund K
发表日期	2010
出处	Journal of Evolutionary Economics 20 (2): 203-217
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	Cooperation in joint enterprises poses a social dilemma. How can altruistic behavior be sustained if selfish alternatives provide a higher payoff? This social dilemma can be overcome by the threat of sanctions. But a sanctioning system is itself a public good and poses a second-order social dilemma. In this paper, we show by means of deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game theory that imitation-driven evolution can lead to the emergence of cooperation based on punishment, provided the participation in the joint enterprise is not compulsory. This surprising result -- cooperation can be enforced if participation is voluntary -- holds even in the case of 'strong altruism', when the benefits of a player's contribution are reaped by the other participants only.
主题	Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
关键词	Evolutionary game theory Public goods games Cooperation Costly punishment Social dilemma Strong altruism Voluntary interactions
URL	http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/9272/
来源智库	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/129156
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	De Silva H,Hauert C,Traulsen A,et al. Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism.. 2010.