全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Social control and the social contract: The emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action.

G2TT

来源类型	Article
规范类型	其他
DOI	10.1007/s13235-010-0001-4
	Social control and the social contract: The emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action.
	Sigmund K; Hauert C; Traulsen A; De Silva H
发表日期	2011
出处	Dynamic Games and Applications 1 (1): 149-171
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	Punishment of free-riders is generally viewed as an important factor in promoting cooperation. But since it is often costly to sanction exploiters, the emergence of such a behavior and its stability raise interesting problems. Players who do not contribute to the sanctions, but profit from the increased level of cooperation caused by them, act as "second-order exploiters" and threaten the joint enterprise. In this paper, we review the role of voluntary participation in stabilizing and upholding cooperation with or without punishment. In particular, we deal with two distinct forms of punishment, namely peer punishment and pool punishment, and compare their stability and their efficiency. The emergence and upkeep of collaborative undertakings can strongly depend on whether participation is voluntary or mandatory. The possibility to opt out of a joint enterprise often helps in curbing exploiters and boosting pro-social behavior.
主题	Evolution and Ecology (EEP)
关键词	Cooperation Costly punishment Evolutionary game theory Public goods games Social dilemma Voluntary interactions
URL	http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/9618/
来源智库	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/129329
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Sigmund K,Hauert C,Traulsen A,et al. Social control and the social contract: The emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action.. 2011.