全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Beyond pairwise strategy updating in the prisoner's dilemma game.

G2TT

来源类型	Article
规范类型	其他
DOI	10.1038/srep00740
	Beyond pairwise strategy updating in the prisoner's dilemma game.
	Wang XF; Perc M; Liu YK; Chen X; Wang L
发表日期	2012
出处	Scientific Reports 2: no.740
出版年	2012
语种	英语
摘要	In spatial games players typically alter their strategy by imitating the most successful or one randomly selected neighbor. Since a single neighbor is taken as reference, the information stemming from other neighbors is neglected, which begets the consideration of alternative possibly more realistic approaches. Here we show that strategy changes inspired not only by the performance of individual neighbors but rather by entire neighborhoods introduce a qualitatively different evolutionary dynamics that is able to support the stable existence of very small cooperative clusters. This leads to phase diagrams that differ significantly from those obtained by means of pairwise strategy updating. In particular, the survivability of cooperators is possible even by high temptations to defect and over a much wider uncertainty range. We support the simulation results by means of pair approximations and analysis of spatial patterns, which jointly highlight the importance of local information for the resolution of social dilemmas.
主题	Evolution and Ecology (EEP) ; Postdoctoral Scholars (PDS)
关键词	Computational biology and bioinformatics Biophysics Information theory and computation Statistical physics Thermodynamics and nonlinear dynamics
URL	http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/9857/
来源智库	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/129404
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Wang XF,Perc M,Liu YK,et al. Beyond pairwise strategy updating in the prisoner's dilemma game.. 2012.

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