G2TT
来源类型Article
规范类型其他
DOI10.1073/pnas.1115219109
The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.
Brannstrom Å; Sigmund K
发表日期2012
出处Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (4): 1165-1169
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要Self-interest frequently causes individuals engaged in joint enterprises to choose actions that are counterproductive. Free-riders can invade a society of cooperators, causing a tragedy of the commons. Such social dilemmas can be overcome by positive or negative incentives. Even though an incentive-providing institution may protect a cooperative society from invasion by free-riders, it cannot always convert a society of free-riders to cooperation. In the latter case, both norms, cooperation and defection, are stable: To avoid a collapse to full defection, cooperators must be sufficiently numerous initially. A society of free-riders is then caught in a social trap, and the institution is unable to provide an escape, except at a high, possibly prohibitive cost. Here, we analyze the interplay of (a) incentives provided by institutions and (b) the effects of voluntary participation. We show that this combination fundamentally improves the efficiency of incentives. In particular, optional participation allows institutions punishing free-riders to overcome the social dilemma at a much lower cost, and to promote a globally stable regime of cooperation. This removes the social trap and implies that whenever a society of cooperators cannot be invaded by free-riders, it will necessarily become established in the long run, through social learning, irrespective of the initial number of cooperators. We also demonstrate that punishing provides a "lighter touch" than rewarding, guaranteeing full cooperation at considerably lower cost.
主题Evolution and Ecology (EEP) ; Postdoctoral Scholars (PDS)
关键词Punishment Rewards Public goods Social contact Evolutionary games
URLhttp://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/9984/
来源智库International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/129410
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Brannstrom Å,Sigmund K. The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas.. 2012.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
The%20take-it-or-lea(505KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Brannstrom Å]的文章
[Sigmund K]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Brannstrom Å]的文章
[Sigmund K]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Brannstrom Å]的文章
[Sigmund K]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: The%20take-it-or-leave-it%20option%20allows%20small%20penalties%20to%20overcome%20social%20dilemmas.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。