全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Impact of generalized benefit functions on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with continuous strategies.

G2TT

来源类型	Article
规范类型	其他
DOI	10.1103/PhysRevE.85.066133
	Impact of generalized benefit functions on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with continuous strategies.
	Chen X; Szolnoki A; Perc M; Wang L
发表日期	2012
出处	Physical Review E 85 (6)
出版年	2012
语种	英语
摘要	Cooperation and defection may be considered to be two extreme responses to a social dilemma. Yet the reality is much less clear-cut. Between the two extremes lies an interval of ambivalent choices, which may be captured theoretically by means of continuous strategies defining the extent of the contributions of each individual player to the common pool. If strategies are chosen from the unit interval, where 0 corresponds to pure defection and 1 corresponds to the maximal contribution, the question is what is the characteristic level of individual investments to the benefit functions, and we show that in a structured population there exist intermediate values of both at which the collective contributions are maximal. However, as the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation increases, the characteristic threshold decreases while the corresponding steepness increases. Our observations remain valid if more complex sigmoid functions are used, thus reenforcing the importance of carefully adjusted benefits for high levels of public cooperation.
主题	Evolution and Ecology (EEP) ; Postdoctoral Scholars (PDS)
关键词	Benefit functions Evolution of cooperation Extreme response Public goods games Sigmoid function Social dilemmas Structured population Two parameter Unit intervals
URL	http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/9898/
来源智库	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/129503
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Chen X,Szolnoki A,Perc M,et al. Impact of generalized benefit functions on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with continuous strategies.. 2012.